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Even a three-year-old child Can understand 
a story about 'people too little to see'... - 
Hilary Putnam, 'What Theories Are Not' 
If one has to imagine some one else's pain 
on the model of one's own, this is none too 
easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine 
pain I do not feel on the model of the pain 
which I do feel. - Wittgenstein, Phil. 
Investigations 
I 
Faced with the difficulty of  rationalizing the intuitive non-deductive principles 
o f  inference we employ as guides to a transcendent truth one may be tempted, 
in the vein o f  Peirce, to offer a reductive account of  what truth is, taking it 
to be that which is, if only in the 'long run', that which is warrantedly 
assertible. 
Sirnilafly, faced with the apparently intractable problems one encounters 
when one takes meaning, to be characterized in terms of  truth-conditions, 
there is a strong temptation to offer an account of  sense which ties it 
primarily to the conditions under which we are warranted in asserting and 
denying a proposition. Such a verificationist account o f  meaning is supported 
even more strongly by the doctrine o f  meaning as use, and by arguments to 
the effect that learning the meaning of  an expression can only be learning 
when it is appropriate to use it or to accept or criticize another's use of  it; 
and, hence, that what is learned when meaning is grasped must be, primarily, 
these very conditions of  acceptancy and rejection. 
That an adequate theory o f  meaning will invoke the conditions under 
which we are warranted in accepting and rejecting an assertion at some points 
in its structure is something many will accept. But a very fundamental ques- 
tion is this: Must an account o f  the meaning of  an assertion be an account o f  
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the grounds for accepting and rejecting it for every assertion whose meaning 
is to be characterized? Or might the situation be, rather, that for some asser- 
tions one must, to give their meaning, stipulate their verification and falsifi- 
cation conditions, but this need not be done assertion-by-assertion for every 
proposition accepted as meaningful? Could we not, in some way, project an 
understanding of meaning throughout language, using its structural features 
as the guide to correct projection, from some fundamental basis to which 
meaning accrues in a manner acceptable to a verificationist? 
The basic idea is simple, if, admittedly, terribly vague. For those proposi- 
tions whose truth-conditions are accessible to us, meaning is given by stipu- 
lating the conditions of warranted acceptability and rejectabflity. For these 
propositions giving the verification and falsification conditions is giving the 
truth.conditions and, surely, on anyone's view of meaning, fully characteri- 
zing the meaning. But for those propositions whose truth-conditions are, 
somehow, 'inaccessible' to us we are blocked from this route. The solution 
is not to force us to reject our intuitive picture of the proposition as having 
inacessible truth-conditions, offering a verificationist revision of just what 
the meaning of the proposition 'really' is; but, rather, to offer an account of 
how we can grasp the meaning of these propositions without stipulating for 
them directly conditions of warranted assertabllity and rejectability. Instead 
we offer an account of how an understanding of these propositions arises 
indirectly out of their structural relationship, intralinguistically, to the propo- 
sitions whose truth conditions are open to us. 
It is one version of such a theory that I intend to look at here. 
II 
It would be useful here to make some brief remarks about the overall 
structure of various aspects of the traditional verificationist program. While 
everyone is familiar with many of the objections in detail which apparently 
vitiated these programs, some remarks about the general structure of the 
alleged failures will be important here. 
The positivists tried to present both criteria of meaningfulness and a 
theory of meaning. The criteria of meaningfulness were usually framed in 
terms of sentences, principles being offered to determine when a proposition 
was meaningful in terms of its bearing some appropriate logical relationship 
to the distinguished class of observational, and hence prima facie meaning- 
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ful, propositions. Of course there is also a tradition of attempting to apply 
a criterion of meaningfulness for terms as well. Theories of  meaning were 
presented in the form of a theory of how terms accrue meaning on the basis 
of an antecedently given observational vocabulary. That a theory of meaning 
would be given as a theory of term meaning seems an inevitable consequence 
of componentialism, i.e. of the realization that a theory of meaning must pro- 
ceed by terms unless an infinite number of distinct sentences are to have 
meaning assigned to them one at a time. Curiously not much attention was 
paid by the verificationists to the fact that even if we could characterize 
the class of meaningful terms, and specify their meanings, we would still 
need a theory which tells us when a given combination of terms into a 
sentence is meaningful and which tells us how to generate the meaning of the 
whole sentence out of the meanings of the component terms. This will be 
essential for us later. 
The history of the verificationist programs is a history of progressive 
weakening. First only sentences strictly verifiable and strictly falsifiable are 
considered meaningful. But then vast numbers of prima facie meaningful 
propositions of science are declared metaphysical or, at least, unscientific. 
So the criterion is weakened in one direction or another. Well known is the 
direction in which one allows the use of auxiliary sentences in testing a 
sentence for meaningfulness by exploring its deductive connections with 
observational sentences. But then it became hard to formulate a criterion 
which excludes any sentence at all from the realm of the meaningful. Alter- 
natively, one can weaken the criterion by allowing inductive or probabilistic 
relations between observation sentence and theoretical sentence rather than 
insisting on a strict deductive relation between the two. Or one could move in 
both directions simultaneously. I f  one chooses to deal with terms rather than 
sentences, a parallel process of weakening is observed as the authors move 
from operational or coordinative definitions, to reduction sentences, to the 
holistic notion of partial interpretation. Here again, by allowing inductive 
connections between observational consequences and theory to legitimize 
a theory, and hence to give meaning to the terms appropriately appearing 
in it, a weakening in the other direction is invoked as well. 
It  is well known that the weakening of the original strict verificationist 
criteria cannot be accomplished without severe difficulties infecting the 
program. Once allow as meaningful an assertion whose truth-conditions 
cannot be fully stipulated in terms of the observational vocabulary and it 
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becomes hard to see how any sentence or term can be excluded from the 
realm of the meaningful. This is most obvious when the move toward holism is 
made, that is when 'auxiliary sentences' are allowed in testing a sentence for 
meaningfulness or when 'partial interpretation' of terms replaces strict opera- 
tional definitions. What we must be clear about, though, is that the failure 
to produce a definitive verificationist criterion of meaningfulness is not the 
result of mere technical difficulties, but is, instead, the result of very serious 
difficulties the approach faces as soon as it abandons the most naive and rigid 
standards of strict necessary and sufficient truth conditions framed in the 
observation language. 
Each direction of weakening, the holistic which allows the invocation of 
auxiliary sentences when testing a sentence for meaningfulness or the invoca- 
tion of other theoretical terms when testing a term for meaningfulness, and 
the criterial which allows the use of inductivist or probabilistic connections 
between the theoretical and the observational to serve as the test for meaning- 
fulness, suffers its own characteristic difficulties. The real force of these 
difficulties only becomes apparent when one moves from the comparatively 
easy task of specifying a criterion for meaningfulness to the much more 
difficult task of offering a full-fledged theory of meaning for theoretical 
discourse. 
The holistic case is the more familiar. Once take whole theories as the 
appropriate bearers of meaning, and, in the domain of inference, take res- 
ponsibility to the phenomena as the basic criterion of warrant for their 
acceptability (allowing, possibly, as well simplicity, methodological con- 
servatism, et al. to also play a role), it then becomes hard to see how either 
independent non-theory-relative meaning is to be assigned to any sentential 
atom of the theory, or independent reference and extension to that sentence's 
component singular terms and predicates. On the inferential plane it is hard 
to see how independent warrant is to be assigned to sentences one at a time. 
This difficulty shows itself most clearly in the familiar feature of duality. 
Given a theory which adequately saves the phenomena we can also cook up 
innumerable others, superficially inconsistent with the given original theory, 
by simply .compensating for variation in one place with a saving variation 
elsewhere. On the level of inference such duality leads to skepticism, a 
priorism or, their not-particulafly4ntelligible relative, conventionalism. But, 
much deeper, is what duality leads to one the level of meaning theory. Either 
directly, as in Eddington, Reichenbach, et al., or more obscurely on the part 
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of some recent authors, duality on the theoretical level leads us by a smooth 
chain of  argument to a denial of  genuine (or, perhaps, unrelativized) meaning 
(and reference) to the sentences of  the theory taken one at a time or to their 
components. Truth is denied to the sentences individually, but said to be 
applicable to them only relative to the remaining body of theory; and the 
reference of the terms and predicates of the sentences is again now only 
'relative' to the remaining theoretical context. Commonly (and plausibly) 
we are led by such arguments to the dilemma of either retreating to the 
reductionist analysis of  the meaning of theoretical assertions which the strict 
verificationist had in mind in the first place, or, instead, to a denial of  reduc- 
tionism which succeeds in finding a role for the individual theoretical 
sentences by, in its meaning theory, denying them meaning properly so called 
at all - that is, by a retreat to instrumentalism for the theoretical apparatus. 
The loosening of strict verificationism which proceeds by way of replacing 
entailment relations with relations of warranted assertability, inductive 
probability, etc. also faces serious problems. Here the fundamental difficulty 
is not of holism. In the case where verificationism was weakened by allow- 
ing in auxiliary sentences in tests of meaningfulness and by taking meaning 
as role played in total theory, the difficulty is in reconciling an empiricism 
which fundamentally takes whole theories as the units of meaning with an 
attempt to preserve notions of truth, reference, etc. distributed 'atomistically' 
over individual sentences and their component referring expressions. In this 
new case the problem is trying to reconcile the new theory of meaning 
appropriate to this weakened criterion of meaningfulness with the basic 
intuitions we have connecting the notions of  meaning and truth. 
It is almost a truism to claim that a stipulation of the meaning of an asser- 
tion requires at least a stipulation of its truth conditions. This might not be 
enough, as we know, because of all the familiar arguments to the effect that 
logically equivalent assertions need not be synonymous, etc. But, surely, one 
argues, saying under what circumstances an assertion is true and under what 
false constitutes a necessary component in specifying its meaning. Then one 
goes on to account for the meanings of  the components of the sentence in 
terms of their contribution to the sense, i.e. the truth-condition stipulation, 
of  the whole. 
But if  we are to be allowed to introduce novel assertions into our language 
on the basis solely of  their inferential relations to already understood asser- 
tions, where these inferential relations are less then deductive and so are not 
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sufficient even to characterize the truth-condition of the assertion so 
introduced, then what are we to make of this intuitively obvious claim that 
the meaning of an assertion is a stipulation of the conditions under which it 
is true and under which it is false? 
The theory which takes the fundamental primitive in meaning theory to be 
warranted assertability rather than truth faces a dilemma. Either it reserves a 
place for a limited class of assertions whose meaning is given by our recogni- 
tion of the truth-conditions for them (observation sentences, perhaps) or it 
does not. In the former case those assertions not in the privileged class seem 
to have such an attenuated sense of meaning left over for them (in 
comparison with that rich, full sense of meaning possessed by the members 
of the privileged class whose meaning is their recognizable truth-condition) 
that we are easily led to an instrumentalistic account of their role in our 
conceptual scheme. Their meaning doesn't refer to their truth-conditions, 
their singular terms don't have reference in the full sense, nor their predicates 
extensions. Why then take their apparent ontological commitments, etc. 
seriously at all? 
The alternative is to hold that the meaning of all assertions is given by 
their conditions of warranted assertability and deniability and that the 
recognizability of truth-conditions never plays a role in the comprehension 
of meanings. Such a fiat-out anti-truth-condition theory of meaning is hard 
to criticize, expecially since, despite Dummett's suggestive work, no such 
theory has even really been made available to us for our inspection. Dum- 
mett suggests to us that the adoption of all-out verificationism wtl, at the 
very least, require a revision in our logic, from traditional to intuitionistic 
logic or some variant thereof. Far more serious is the full anti-realism which 
one will then seem to be committed to. If all sentences have as their meaning 
something specified in terms of conditions of warranted assertabflity and 
deniability; if for all of them meaning is disconnected to the notion of truth- 
condition, and, hence, for their components, meaning is disconnected from 
the orthodox notions of reference and extension, what will be left of the 
connection between language and the world at all? It is one thing for Wittgen- 
stein, advocating a verificationist account of mentalistic language, to t e l  us 
that a nothing would do as well as a something so far as the meaning of 'pain' 
is concerned. It is something else again to adopt such a cavalier attitude 
toward being in general. 
The parallel here with the case of inference is clear. Once adopt a founda- 
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tion language of propositions warranted by direct access to the states of the 
world they describe, and skepticism about the truth of the remaining sentences, 
believed on such far more slender warrant, rears its head. Deny the existence 
of foundation statements altogether and one quickly finds oneself on the 
slide from a coherence theory of warrant toward a coherence theory of truth. 
What we see here is that on the level of the theory of meaning, and even 
without the coherentist's holism, a doctrine which eliminates truth-conditions 
altogether in favor of conditions of warranted assent and dissent soon loses 
any ability to account for the connection between language and an indepen- 
dent world of things, properties and facts. Perhaps, once again, the world is 
well lost as Rorty would have us believe, but it is a radical step to take and 
one we would do well to hesitate before taking. Incidentally, this dilemma 
of either reserving a special class of observation sentences or else treating 
all sentences on a par gives rise to similar difficulties for the holist as well. 
Ill  
Given the difficulties of sustaining a realistic interpretation of terms and sen- 
tences referring to unobservables on either the holistic or verificationistic 
accounts, it would seem prudent to at least explore any prima facie viable 
alternative which presents itself. One such alternative has particular appeal 
since the model of understanding it presents is one which seems to us pre- 
theoretically (rightly or wrongly) to have plausibility to it. The view is this: 
Basic sentences describing epistemically accessible states of affairs are learned 
by us by the presentation to us of the appropriate states of affairs. The 
meaning of the assertion is then given by association of it with its directly 
available truth-conditions. But such basic sentences are made up out of com- 
ponents and, indeed, on the model of  any adequate theory of language based 
on a componentialist semantics (And what other kind could possibly explain 
our mastery of a potentially infinite collection of novel sentences?) the 
meaning of the whole sentence must be understood as being generated out of 
the meanings of the components and their grammatical assemblage into the 
whole sentence. But then we can understand, once again on a componentialist 
theory of meaning for the wholes as generated out of the meaning of parts, 
novel sentences constructed out of these very same elements, the elements 
first introduced to us through their role in sentences whose truth-conditions 
are open to our direct inspection. But these novel sentences may describe 
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states of affairs not open to our observational capacities. Hence, on a 
basically verificationist theory of meaning, one can understand how it is that 
one can have an understanding of  sentences which describe states of  affairs 
whose truth-conditions cannot be 'presented' to us. But, on this account, the 
meaning of sentences is supposed to be given individually, rescuing us from 
the dualities of holism and its conventionalist consequences, and the meaning 
of the novel assertion is connected to its truth-condition, and not to 
conditions of warranted assertability and deniability, and, hence, the new 
approach is supposed to give us genuine reference for the components of the 
novel assertion and genuine truth for the assertion as a whole. 
That such an account is fraught with difficulty is, I think, obvious. But 
that it is one many people intuitively accept on a pre-theoretical level is also 
clear. Knowing what 'red' means from such cases as ~Fhis is a red apple' I 
have no difficulty in understanding what it is for something to be a red object 
too small to see. Knowing what pain is from my own case I understand (pace 
Wittgenstein) what it is for you to be in pain. Remembering the famous 
(notorious?) argument from analogy to the legitimacy of belief in your 
mental states on the analogy with my own, it becomes not implausible to call 
such a theory as the present one a theory of meaning by analogy. The general 
structure of the theory here looks like this: Initially meaning accrues to 
whole sentences by an association of the sentence with its (conventionally 
determined) truth-condition, which 'state of affairs' is directly open to 
epistemic access. Meaning then accrues to sentences in the language whose 
truth-conditions are not so accessible by a process of decomposition and reas- 
sembly which proceeds by an understanding of the way in which the meaning 
of whole sentences is formed out of the meaning of their parts. 
I don't think that even that loose characterization will do for all those 
cases which one might call projection of meaning by analogy. For example, 
it is sometimes claimed that quantification over an infinite domain is under- 
stood 'analogically' from quantification over finite domains. Here the 'projec- 
tion' of meaning by analogy does not seem obviously assimilable to the 
notion of sentential decomposition and reassembly. 
As a first step at exploring the possibility of  such a notion of 'semantic 
analogy' playing a respectable role in an overall semantic account of meaning, 
let us first look at a number of  objections to such a theory of meaning accrual. 
These objections are basically of two kinds: from cases and from general 
principles. 
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The refutation of semantic analogy by cases goes like this: The existence 
of obviously nonsensical sentences made up 'grammatically' out of parts 
which are plainly meaningful when they appear in other sentences shows 
us that projection of meaning by decomposition and reassembly is illegiti- 
mate. There are two kinds of cases, those of 'ordinary language': 'It is five 
o'clock on the sun'; and those of science: 'Two spatially separated events are 
simultaneous', 'This electron is green'. 
Now of course we could deny the meaninglessness of the sentences 
adduced. But even if we accept them as meaningless, their existence doesn't 
show that projectign of meaning by decomposition and reassembly is always 
illegitimate. It does show that it sometimes is. The existence of such cases 
(very familiar from Wittgenstein who wishes to break the alleged stranglehold 
of the 'false picture' of meaning by analogy has on us) does indeed show us 
that the advocate of the legitimacy of meaning by analogy has his work cut 
out for him. For he must make at least the first steps toward a theory of 
semantic projection which will delineate the range of legitimate projection of 
meaning by analogy. Such a theory might at least initially proceed by a 
theory of 'semantic categorization' of terms, marking out by means of con- 
struction rules legitimate from illegitimate combinations in terms of the 
semantic categories into which terms are placed. Such a theory would not, I 
believe, work in general. In any case, it could be but the most rudimentary 
intermediate step in our theory, for the very notion of semantic categoriza- 
tion itself calls out for explanation. 
Here, as elsewhere, the parallel of the theory of meaning with the theory 
of believability is interesting. As we now know, the believer in inductive 
inference has his work cut out for him as well. Even prior to the establish- 
ment of a final 'justification' for inductive reasoning, he must first give us 
at least a rudimentary description of what inductive reasoning consists in. 
Even on the very naive model of inductive generalization as induction by 
enumeration, the existence of unnatural classifications of things (with 'grue' 
as the extreme case of an illegitimate classificatory term) shows that there is 
a fundamental problem first to be faced in trying to delineate the legitimate 
from the illegitimate cases of inference and to somehow rationalize (or at 
least explain) the boundary between the two. 
Over and above the 'refutation by cases' (the form of refutation which 
appears very dearly in the relvant portion of Wittgenstein's Investigations) 
one can fred attempts at more 'theoretical' refutations of the view that 
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meaning can accrue by the analogy ofepistemically unaccessible to epistemi- 
cally accessible states of affairs. 
One such refutation is that of Dummett. 1 Basically, the line of argument 
is this: The theorist who believes that meaning can accrue by analogy is 
basically a 'realist' in semantics. That is, he takes the meaning of an assertion 
to be its truth-conditions. But then how do we understand the meaning of an 
assertion? Only by 'grasping' its truth-conditions. What can this amount to? 
Either being able to stipulate those truth-conditions in some non-trivial verbal 
way (say by offering a reductive analysis of the meaning of the assertion) or 
by knowing what it takes to determine the truth or falsehood of the 
assertion. Now consider those assertions whose truth-conditions outrun the 
limits of epistemic accessibility. The 'meaning by analogy' theorist envisages 
someone who can determine the truth or falsity of such an assertion by 
means 'analogous' but not identical to those we employ. It is such an exten- 
ded notion of verification, he claims, which is sufficient to give meaning to 
these assertions, and reference to such an extended method of verification 
which, indeed, specifies what the meaning of these, in actual fact, unverifiable 
and unfalsifiable, assertions is. 
Now, Dummett continues, where the analogy of the new extended method 
of verification to our usual methods is weak or non-existent, the analogist 
admits that meaning cannot accrue in this way. Hence, while it might be 
legitimate to think of meaning accruing to quantifications over infinite 
totalities by envisaging someone who can 'survey' an infinite class as we 
survey a finite class by exhaustive enumeration of cases, none but the most 
ardent analogist is likely to be satisfied with a theory of the meaning of 
modal assertions which gives us a verifier with the extended capability of  
surveying the contents of other possible worlds. 
But, Dummett says, these distinctions are only of psychological importan- 
ce, explanatory only of why the analogist thinks that he has a theory of 
meaning even in his best cases where the analogy is clearest. For even in those 
cases he is viewing the meaning of an assertion not as we use it but as his 
super-powered verifier uses it and, hence, as far as a theory of meaning of 
assertions in our language does, he is mis.representing the use of the assertion 
in language and misconstruing its meaning. 
I think, though, that this refutation of what Dummett calls (curiously) 
'strong realism' isn't conclusive against the analogist's case. Even if we take 
the analogy to be, as Dummett suggests, one between our actual methods of 
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verification and those of an imagined super-being, is it so clear that the ana- 
logist is blocked in claiming that the presentation of such an analogy is 
enough to give us a grasp of the meaning of the assertion in question? The 
claim that this must be a misconstrual of the meaning as the method of 
verification described is not that actually employed by us is persuasive only 
if one has already accepted the verificationist's identification of the meaning 
of an assertion with its method of verification as it is actually used, which is, 
of course, exactly what the analogist is anxious to deny. 
Furthermore, is it so clear that it is an analogy of methods of verification 
that the analogist really has in mind? To be sure he identifies the meaning 
of an assertion with its truth-conditions and grasping the meaning with 'grasp- 
ing' the truth-conditions. But why should he agree that this can only amount 
to grasping that method by which we, or at least some analogically more 
powerful extension of our selves, would use to determine the truth or false- 
hood of the assertion? Once again that is only plausible if one is a verifica- 
tionist to begin with. Most likely the analogist's position is, rather, something 
like this: For the basic assertions, those whose truth-conditions are directly 
accessible to us epistemically, we learn their meaning by associating them 
directly with the presented truth-condition. Of course since directly being 
aware of the existence of  the truth-condition is the primary and most conclu- 
sive warrant we could possibly have for believing in these propositions, one 
could also identify the meaning of  the assertion with the primary grounds for 
warranting belief in it - without committing oneself, of  course, to a verifica- 
tionist theory of meaning. For those assertions whose truth-conditions are 
not open to our epistemic access, we understand their meaning by grasping 
their truth-condition. We do this latter by seeing the analogy of the truth- 
condition of this new assertion with the truth-condition of some one or more 
of the basis assertions. But it is an analogy of truth~conditions which is rele- 
vant, not of methods of verification at all. 
An example might make this clearer. How do I know the meaning of 'He 
is in pain'? Well, from my own case I know the meaning of 'I am in pain'. By 
decomposition (structural understanding of the latter assertion and how its 
components function together to make up a meaningful whole) I know what 
'is in pain' means and by reassembly I know what 'He is in pain' means. Isn't 
that the analogist's argument? It is not that I imagine someone who, unlike 
me, can immediately experience everyone's pain, nor even that I grasp the 
meaning of 'He is in pain' by seeing the analogy between his directly 
228 LAWRENCESKLAR 
experiencing his pains and me mine, and then relying upon the association 
of meaning with method of verification to think I now grasp the meaning 
of 'He is in pain'. No. It is that the meaning of 'He is in pain' is given by its 
truth-conditions, and these I understand by their analogy with the (directly 
epistemically accessible) truth-conditions of 'I am in pain'. It is something 
like a state-of-affairs which I am supposed to 'grasp' on the analogy with a 
directly experiencible state-of-affairs that is at the heart of the analogist's 
claim seen from this point of view. Of course this is not a theory of meaning 
and it isn't clear that there is any coherent theory which can 'back up' this 
initial 'model' or 'picture'. We will return to this problem shortly. 
IV 
I have no intention here, of course, of even making reasonably coherent 
suggestions about just what a theory of meaning would be which would 
allow for the embedding in it of a theory of legitimate projection of meaning 
by means of analogy. Rather, I will just note four aspects of the problem of 
meaning by analogy which are of some importance, aspects which will come 
under discussion, I think, no matter what the general meaning theory is to be 
which allows for analogical projection of the comprehension of the meaning 
of assertions. 
A. Skepticism 
If we agree that we can grasp the meaning of proposition on the basis of 
their analogy with previously understood propositions, we must realize 
that we have opened ourselves up to the possibility of meaningful assertions 
relative to which no grounds of warranted assertability and deniabflity are 
forthcoming (or, perhaps, even could be forthcoming). This is not to say 
that the believer in semantic analogy must be committed to the com- 
prehendability of at least some 'undecidable' propositions, but only that 
he might be. 
In this way he surely differs from the verificationist. If the very meaning 
of the proposition is fixed by the warranting conditions for it, one need never 
fear that one will come upon a meaningful assertion for which warranting 
conditions are not forthcoming. Probably, also, in this the believer in seman- 
tic analogy differs from the holist as well, although it isn't as clear in this 
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case as it is in the case of the verificationist account of  meaning. For the 
holist the meaning of the assertions not asserting the existence of conditions 
directly open to epistemic access is fLxed by the role the assertion plays in 
a total theory. But the total theory must be responsible, presumably only to 
the empirical facts which could serve to confirm or disconfirm it. Now if we 
take it as a sufficient condition of theoretical synonymy (two theories being 
equivalent in the sense of  'saying the same thing') that the two theories have 
a common body of observational consequences, then once again skepticism 
has been undercut. We need not fear the existence of alternative theories 
which cannot be judged relative to one another because they have their 
empirical consequences in common, for in the case of  common consequences 
we just assimilate the theories together by characterizing them as 
synonymous. And of course the holist will not countenance our asking 
the question of how we test individually the assertions of the theory for 
acceptability, since it is just this consideration of the assertions 'one at a time' 
which he will not allow. 
But if it is true that both verificationism and holism amount to a denial of 
realism for the assertions whose truth-conditions lie outside the range of 
direct epistemic accessibility, then it is hardly a surprise that the semantic 
analogist has greater concern than they over the problems of skepticism. 
For he takes these 'theoretical' assertions to be true and false, as are the 
'observational', and their components to have genuine reference, extension, 
etc. And yet he freely admits that the truth-conditions for the assertion are 
not the sort we can simply observe to either be or not be the case. I f  I take 
it that 'He is in pain' is an assertion of  the existence of a mental state of  
another, not open to my epistemic access, then of course I will worry about 
how I can ever really know whether or not someone is in pain in a manner 
which will not bother at all someone to whom a nothing would do as well 
as a something as far as the meaning of 'pain' was concerned. 
B. The Limits of  Meaning by Analogy 
To just what extend can we project meaning out 'of  our basis sentences and on 
to new assertions by means of semantic analogy? Perhaps, if we take basic 
sentences as reporting the contents of  immediate subjective awareness, we 
could project meaning onto assertions about the external world. At least 
Locke thought that we could although Berkeley's familiar criticisms make 
230 L A W R E N C E  S K L A R  
us pause even here. Perhaps, using a projection of meaning by analogy, we can 
understand sentences attributing mental states to others on the basis of our 
understanding of mentalistic assertions about our own private mental states. 
Although, again, Wittgenstein would have us doubt even this. But to what 
extent can we support, for example, a realistic interpretation of theoretical 
assertions in science by a program which initially attributes intelligible 
meaning to these assertions on the basis of their semantic analogy with asser- 
tions of the observation language assumed to be understood? 
Perhaps it isn't too unreasonable to view bacteria as, among other things, 
tiny objects too small to see. Even for molecules the analogy is 'good enough' 
to allow us to at least plausibly maintain that we understand the kinetic 
theory of gases on the analogy with a box filled with rapidly moving billiard 
balls. But when we get to electrons, quarks, photons, or worse yet, virtual 
intermediate massless bosons, charm, etc. what earthly use can we make of 
analogy as a source of  meaning? 
I think there are two things that can be said. First, even in some pretty 
recherchd cases there is still a certain amount of theoretical predication going 
on which can at least plausibly be argued to be understood in the analogical 
way. Even if virtual particles are sufficiently remote from dust particles 
in their properties that to speak of them as particles at all is just to mislead, 
still they do have, perhaps, spatiotemporal location, momentum, energy, etc. 
and perhaps these can be understood on analogy with those features when 
predicated of  objects of  experience. Second, insofar as the features of things 
cannot be understood on any analogy whatever with features of the elements 
of experience, we can, at this point, always retreat to an instrumentalistic 
denial of  full meaning to the predicates altogether. 
Electric charge is just the disposition to behave in certain ways under 
certain test conditions; the psi-function of quantum mechanics is just an 'in. 
tervening variable' connecting test conditions and results of measurements, 
both characterized in the old observational vocabulary, but having no 
independent meaning or reference of its own, etc. Witness Bohr's insistence 
that our body of real concepts will always be restricted to those familiar 
to us from everyday experience, the rest of the theoretical apparatus to be 
understood only functionally relative to assertions framed in this original 
vocabulary. 
Now it may very well be that the disposition on our part to hold to a 
realistic interpretation of theoretical assertions when they are framed in the 
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familiar vocabulary of observational experience, and retreat to instrumentalism 
only when terms are invoked which can't be understood analogically on the 
basis of observational predicates is a more psychological prejudice on our part. 
Certainly this would be the claim of the orthodox verificationist and the 
holist. But I think it would be as premature to dogmatically accept such a 
claim and reject our 'intuitions', vague as they may be, as it would be to 
rashly accept the Humean claim that our belief in the uniformity of nature 
is but a refection of psychologically explicable prejudice and not a rational 
and rationalizable approach to an attempt to know what goes on in the world. 
C. Legitimate vs Illegitimate Analogy 
As noted earlier a primary assault on the very notion of semantic analogy 
proceeds by attempting to show that the principles the analogist uses to 
allow the projection of meaning from sentence to sentence - basically, I have 
claimed, the principle of decomposition and reassembly - are such that they 
lead to the claimed intelligibility a prima facie meaningless utterances ('It is 
five o'clock on the sun', 'The number three is thinking of Vienna'. etc.). Now 
obviously the analogist can reply that he doesn't accept any decomposition 
and reassembly of sentential components as guaranteeing a transfer of 
meaningfulness from the original sentences decomposed to the newly 
reassembled utterances. There must be some restrictions on the range of 
decomposition and reassembly. 
But how these restrictions are to be formulated is going to be a matter of 
some difficulty for the analogist. I do not believe that any naive attempt in 
terms, say, of a categorization of vocabulary into semantic classes and an 
attempt to delimit legitimate rules of  assembly in terms of these classes will 
do the job. Even the most obvious rules we think of wilt meet a verificationist 
challenge, we might note. Mere substitution of indexicals is itself dubious, 
according to the verificationist, for, according to him, I don't understand 
'He is in pain' on the basis of 'I am in pain' even though both indexicals refer 
to persons. Again, if some interpreters of relativity are right, Einstein showed 
that we were mistaken in thinking that we could understand the simultaneity 
relation when predicated of events at a distance from one another, just 
because we understood it when predicated of spatially coincident events. 
Now the verificationist might be wrong about these cases, but how is the ana- 
logist to convince him without a fuUfledged theory of the legitimacy of 
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analogical projection of meaning and without an analysis of the limits of 
legitimate meaning projection by analogy? 
The comparison with the verificationist program is interesting here. The 
verificationists provided both a criterion of  meaningfulness, and, much more 
interesting, a doctrine about meaning. The two fit together in an obvious 
way: to specify meaning is to give the conditions of warranted assertability 
and deniability. In the absence of such conditions, the assertion is meaningless. 
What is the analogist's theory of meaning to be, and how, relative to it, are 
the limits of legitimate projection of meaning by analogy to be characterized? 
D. A Theory of Meaning 
We now come to the most fundamental problem with the doctrine of  the 
projectability of  meaning by analogy. Into just what theory of meaning and 
the knowability of meaning is it to be inserted as a viable part? 
The theory is one which takes as fundamental in meaning theory truth- 
conditions and our 'grasp' of them. To understand the meaning of a proposi- 
tion is to know what it asserts, i.e. to understand what it is for it to be true 
and what it is for it to be false. We can 'grasp' a truth-condition by having it 
directly accessible to us (we are immediately aware of the conditions asser- 
ted to be the case for the 'observation sentences') or we can 'grasp' a truth. 
condition by seeing its analogy to a truth-condition already comprehended 
by us, that is by 'constructing' the new truth-condition out of  components 
available to us from their role in antecedently comprehended truth-conditions 
according to structural principles of constituting truth-conditions out of 
objects and properties also familiar to us from understood cases. 
But what all this means is far, far from clear. It smacks all too much of 
a 'picture in the mind' theory of meaning, where comprehension of asser- 
tions is viewed in the manner of an association of sentences with pictures 
and of novel sentences with new pictures made up out of  pieces cut from old 
ones and glued together in novel ways. This won't do, of  course, as a theory 
of meaning. But just what does the analoglst have to put in its place? In 
particular what does he have which is informative over and above the trivia- 
lities which tell us that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to  grasp 
its truth-condition which is, after all, just to know what the sentence means? 
One thing 'grasping a truth-condition' cannot mean, of course, is knowing 
how to determine the truth or falsity of the proposition. For, according 
to this view and in direct conflict with verificationism in any of its forms, 
SEMANTIC ANALOGY 233 
we can perfectly well know the meaning of a proposition and yet have no 
idea whatever how one could possibly determine whether it be true or false. 
And it can't mean simply knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the truth of the proposition. 
Despite the difficulties such a theory of meaning and the comprehension 
of meaning obviously would meet, it still might be worth some effort to find 
such a theory. To convince you of  that let me end with a (familiar) little 
parable. Exploring a distant planet we come upon some entities. Utterly 
unlike any living creatures we are familiar with we still Fred their behavior 
complex enough to offer an account of it in terms of posited internal 
functional states. Let us call one such state being in 'grinch'. Our complex 
functionalist theory sometimes leads us to say 'That one is in the grinch 
state.' After a while a particularly imaginative alien-anthropologist suddenly 
sees close formal parallels between the functional organization of the internal 
states of  the creatures and the 'program' of functional organization of human 
mental states. In this formal parallel, 'being in the grinch state' is located just 
about where 'being in pain' is located in our description of the mental life of 
men. So, speculating, he says: 'Perhaps being in grinch is being in  pain'. 
Now we are not concerned with whether or not he is right. Or even if he 
ever has any good reason for believing he is fight in identifying grinchness 
with pain. The point is, do we not believe that in coming to entertain the 
proposition 'That thing is in pain' he has come to entertain a novel proposi- 
tion different from merely believing 'That creature is in the grinch state', and, 
indeed, a proposition he can understand only because he knows' what pain 
is (presumably, but not necessarily, from his own case). But his means for 
establishing whether or not a creature is in pain are, of  course, the very condi- 
tions he uses for establishing whether or not a creatures grinches. Yet the 
proposition he now takes warranted by 'grinching behavior' is not merely 
that the creature is in a grinch state, but that it is inpain. If  you accept that 
a novel proposition has been entertained by him, then you accept the claim 
that there is more to meaning of  an assertion than its conditions of warranted 
assertability and deniability. And if you accept the claim that this additional 
element is a grasp of meaning which comes about from understanding the 
meanings of  the components in the novel assertion from understanding the 
role they had in previously understood assertions, then you ought to pursue 
an analogical theory of  meaning projection, elusive as such a theory might be. 
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